David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60 (2007)
that the properties of science are purely extrinsic with the metaphysical principle that substances must also have intrinsic properties, the arguments reach the conclusion that there are intrinsic properties of whose natures we cannot know. It is the goal of this paper to establish that such arguments are not just ironic but extremely problematic. The optimistic physicalist principles that help get the argument off the ground ultimately undermine any justification the premises give for acceptance of the conclusion. Though I do find these arguments unsound, it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider them in order to see more clearly what should be the methodology of the philosopher inclined to take the discoveries of physical science as having ontological authority. And, I hope, what follows will prompt the physicalist to ask herself – what room _is_ there for metaphysics once physical science is complete?
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1986/2001). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael Esfeld (2009). The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):179 – 194.
Jesper Kallestrup (2008). Three Strands in Kripke's Argument Against the Identity Theory. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.
Alexander Kelly (2013). Ramseyan Humility, Scepticism and Grasp. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):705-726.
Stephan Leuenberger (2010). Humility and Constraints on O -Language. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):327 - 354.
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