Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):41 – 60 (2007)
|Abstract||that the properties of science are purely extrinsic with the metaphysical principle that substances must also have intrinsic properties, the arguments reach the conclusion that there are intrinsic properties of whose natures we cannot know. It is the goal of this paper to establish that such arguments are not just ironic but extremely problematic. The optimistic physicalist principles that help get the argument off the ground ultimately undermine any justification the premises give for acceptance of the conclusion. Though I do find these arguments unsound, it is nevertheless worthwhile to consider them in order to see more clearly what should be the methodology of the philosopher inclined to take the discoveries of physical science as having ontological authority. And, I hope, what follows will prompt the physicalist to ask herself – what room _is_ there for metaphysics once physical science is complete?|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sean Drysdale Walsh (2011). Maximality, Duplication, and Intrinsic Value. Ratio 24 (3):311-325.
Michael Esfeld (1999). Physicalism and Ontological Holism. Metaphilosophy 30 (4):319-337.
Michael Esfeld (2007). Metaphysics of Science Between Metaphysics and Science. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):199-213.
Michael Esfeld, Do Relations Require Underlying Intrinsic Properties? A Physical Argument for a Metaphysics of Relations.
Tom McClelland (2012). In Defence of Kantian Humility. Thought 1 (1):62-70.
Andrew Newman, The Bundle Theory, the Principle of Unity for Elementary Particulars, and Some Issues.
Benedikt Paul Göcke (2009). What is Physicalism? Ratio 22 (3):291-307.
Roger Harris (2010). Do Material Things Have Intrinsic Properties? Metaphysica 11 (2):105-117.
Derk Pereboom (2011). Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads57 ( #20,772 of 722,752 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #20,343 of 722,752 )
How can I increase my downloads?