British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (4):737-764 (2009)
|Abstract||This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than the other? This paper defends causal foundationalism: the view that facts about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical causation. However, the paper's main goal is to clarify the structure of the debate. At the end of the paper, it is shown how settling the issue about the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making has more than mere intrinsic interest in unifying the very different pursuits that have been undertaken in the philosophy of causation. It can help to break a stalemate that has arisen in the current debate about mental causation|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Brad Weslake (2006). Review of Making Things Happen. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):136-140.
John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.
David Papineau (forthcoming). Causation is Macroscopic but Not Irreducible. In E. J. Lowe & S. Gibb (eds.), The Ontology of Mental Causation.
Jaegwon Kim (1992). The Nonreductivist's Trouble with Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Markus E. Schlosser (2009). Non-Reductive Physicalism, Mental Causation and the Nature of Actions. In H. Leitgeb & A. Hieke (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos.
Brad Weslake (2006). Causation. In Martin Cohen (ed.), Essentials of Philosophy and Ethics. Hodder Arnold.
Peter Menzies & Christian List (forthcoming). The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences. In Cynthia Mcdonald & Graham Mcdonald (eds.), Emergence and Causation.
Mehmet Elgin (forthcoming). How Could There Be True Causal Claims Without There Being Special Causal Facts in the World? Philosophia.
Luke Glynn (2013). Causal Foundationalism, Physical Causation, and Difference-Making. Synthese 190 (6):1017-1037.
Added to index2009-11-21
Total downloads58 ( #17,268 of 556,807 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,807 )
How can I increase my downloads?