A Cognitive Theory of Pretense
| Abstract | Recent accounts of pretense have been underdescribed in a number of ways. In this paper, we present a much more explicit cognitive account of pretense. We begin by presenting a number of real examples of pretense in children and adults. These examples bring out several features of pretense that any adequate theory of pretense must accommodate, and we use these features to develop our theory of pretense. On our theory, pretense representations are contained in a separate workspace, a Possible World Box which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The representations in the Possible World Box can have the same content as beliefs. Indeed, we suggest that pretense representations are in the same representational "code" as beliefs and that the representations in the Possible World Box are processed by the same inference and UpDating mechanisms that operate over real beliefs. Our model also posits a Script Elaborator which is implicated in the embellishment that occurs in pretense. Finally, we claim that the behavior that is seen in pretend play is motivated not from a "pretend desire", but from a real desire to act in a way that fits the description being constructed in the Possible World Box. We maintain that this account can accommodate the central features of pretense exhibited in the examples of pretense, and we argue that the alternative accounts either can't accommodate or fail to address entirely some of the central features of pretense. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesStephen P. Stich & Shaun Nichols (2000). A Cognitive Theory of Pretense. Cognition 74 (2):115-147.
Peter Langland-Hassan (2012). Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.
Jonathan Tallant (forthcoming). Pretense, Mathematics, and Cognitive Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Szabó Gendler (2011). Pretense and Imagination. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 2 (1):79-94.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2003). On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief. In Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.), Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge.
Eric Funkhouser & Shannon Spaulding (2009). Imagination and Other Scripts. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):291-314.
James R. Hamilton (2009). Pretense and Display Theories of Theatrical Performance. Organon F:632-654.
Catherine Wearing (2011). Metaphor, Idiom, and Pretense. Noûs 46 (3):499-524.
Edward N. Zalta (2000). The Road Between Pretense Theory and Abstract Object Theory. In T. Hofweber & A. Everett (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. CSLI Publications.
Shaun Nichols (2006). Just the Imagination: Why Imagining Doesn't Behave Like Believing. Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474.
Neil Van Leeuwen (2011). Imagination is Where the Action Is. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):55-77.
Michael Hicks (2010). A Note on Pretense and Co-Reference. Philosophical Studies 149 (3).
Anna Bjurman Pautz (2008). Fictional Coreference as a Problem for the Pretense Theory. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):147 - 156.
Amie L. Thomasson (2003). Speaking of Fictional Characters. Dialectica 57 (2):205–223.
Peter Gärdenfors (1997). The Role of Memory in Planning and Pretense. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):24-25.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-12-22Total downloads9 ( #113,901 of 548,977 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,977 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
