Against intentionalism

Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304 (2006)
Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to super?cially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Ned Block (2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.

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