Against intentionalism

Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304 (2006)
Abstract
Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to super?cially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke
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    References found in this work BETA
    Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
    Alex Byrne, Inverted Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

    View all 16 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

    View all 7 citations

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