After incompatibilism: A naturalistic defense of the reactive attitudes

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):405-428 (2007)
Abstract
From the first time I encountered the problem of free will in college, it struck me that a clear-eyed view of free will and moral responsibility demanded some form of nihilism. Libertarianism seemed delusional, and compatibilism seemed in bad faith. Hence I threw my lot in with philosophers like Paul d’Holbach, Galen Strawson, and Derk Pereboom who conclude that no one is truly moral responsible. But after two decades of self- identifying as a nihilist, it occurred to me that I had continued to treat my friends
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Tamler Sommers (2009). More Work for Hard Incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.
Manuel Vargas (2012). Why the Luck Problem Isn't. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):419-436.
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