David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26 (2004)
This paper develops an empirical argument that the rejection of moral objectivity leaves important features of moral judgment intact. In each of five reported experiments, a number of participants endorsed a nonobjectivist claim about a canonical moral violation. In four of these experiments, participants were also given a standard measure of moral judgment, the moral/conventional task. In all four studies, participants who respond as nonobjectivists about canonical moral violations still treat such violations in typical ways on the moral/conventional task. In particular, participants who give moral nonobjectivist responses still draw a clear distinction between canonical moral and conventional violations. Thus there is some reason to think that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment are preserved in the absence of a commitment to moral objectivity.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
R. J. R. Blair (1995). A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath. Cognition 57 (1):1-29.
Shaun Nichols (2002). Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment. Cognition 84 (2):221–236.
Gilbert Harman & Judith Jarvis Thomson (1996). Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Philosophy 71 (278):622-624.
Stephen P. Stich & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2001). Jackson's Empirical Assumptions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):637-643.
Citations of this work BETA
Kirk Ludwig (2007). The Epistemology of Thought Experiments : First Person Versus Third Person Approaches. In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Blackwell Pub. Inc. 128-159.
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28 - 53.
Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine (2010). Do You Know More When It Matters Less? Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.
Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias (2007). The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
Hagop Sarkissian, John Park, David Tien, Jennifer Wright & Joshua Knobe (2011). Folk Moral Relativism. Mind and Language 26 (4):482-505.
Similar books and articles
Joan Marie McMahon & Robert J. Harvey (2007). The Effect of Moral Intensity on Ethical Judgment. Journal of Business Ethics 72 (4):335 - 357.
Russell Haines, Marc D. Street & Douglas Haines (2008). The Influence of Perceived Importance of an Ethical Issue on Moral Judgment, Moral Obligation, and Moral Intent. Journal of Business Ethics 81 (2):387 - 399.
Andrew Sneddon (2007). A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding: Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):731 – 748.
Jacqueline L. Reck (2000). Ethics and Budget Allocation Decisions of Municipal Budget Officers. Journal of Business Ethics 27 (4):335 - 350.
David A. Pizarro & Eric Luis Uhlmann (2005). Do Normative Standards Advance Our Understanding of Moral Judgment? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):558-559.
Susan Dwyer (2009). Moral Dumbfounding and the Linguistic Analogy: Methodological Implications for the Study of Moral Judgment. Mind and Language 24 (3):274-296.
Alice Crary (2007). Beyond Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads104 ( #35,544 of 1,789,994 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #59,220 of 1,789,994 )
How can I increase my downloads?