David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):493-506 (2012)
Don Marquis has argued most abortions are immoral, for the same reason that killing you or me is immoral: abortion deprives the fetus of a valuable future. Call this account the FLOA. A rival account is Jeff McMahan’s, time-relative interest account of the wrongness of killing. According to this account, an act of killing is wrong to the extent that it deprives the victim of future value and the relation of psychological unity would have held between the victim at the time of death and herself at a later time if she had lived. The TRIA supposedly has two chief advantages over Marquis’s FLOA. First, unlike the FLOA, the TRIA does not rely on the controversial thesis that identity is what matters in survival. Second, the TRIA yields more plausible verdicts about cases. Proponents of the TRIA use the account to argue that abortion is generally permissible, because there would be little to no psychological unity between the fetus and later selves if it lived. I argue that advocates of the TRIA have failed to establish its superiority to the FLOA, for two reasons. First, the two views are on a par with respect to the thesis that identity is what matters in survival. Second, Marquis’s FLOA does not yield the counterintuitive implications about cases that advocates of the TRIA have attributed to it, and the TRIA yields its own share of implausible judgments about cases
|Keywords||Abortion Killing Harm of death Time-relative interest Future like ours Don Marquis Jeff McMahan David DeGrazia|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
Don Marquis (1989). Why Abortion is Immoral. Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Nils Holtug (2011). Killing and the Time-Relative Interest Account. Journal of Ethics 15 (3):169-189.
C. Strong (2008). A Critique of “the Best Secular Argument Against Abortion”. Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (10):727-731.
S. Matthew Liao (2007). Time-Relative Interests and Abortion. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2):242-256.
Ben Bradley (2008). The Worst Time to Die. Ethics 118 (2):291-314.
Robert P. Lovering (2005). Does a Normal Foetus Really Have a Future of Value? A Reply to Marquis. Bioethics 19 (2):131–45.
Rob Lovering (2009). Futures of Value and the Destruction of Human Embryos. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 463-88.
Donald Wilson (2007). Abortion, Persons, and Futures of Value. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 14 (2):86-97.
Robert Lane (2003). Why I Was Never a Zygote. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):63-83.
Ezio Di Nucci (2009). On How to Interpret the Role of the Future Within the Abortion Debate. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (10):651-652.
Soran Reader (2008). Abortion, Killing, and Maternal Moral Authority. Hypatia 23 (1):132-149.
Marvin Kohl (1971). Abortion and the Argument From Innocence. Inquiry 14 (1-4):147-151.
Ezio Di Nucci (2009). Abortion: Strong's Counterexamples Fail. Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (5):304-305.
Patrick A. Tully (2005). Victims of Abortion and “Victims” of Contraception. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:383-398.
F. M. Kamm (1992). Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2011-08-26
Total downloads69 ( #61,926 of 1,906,942 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #162,558 of 1,906,942 )
How can I increase my downloads?