David A. NICOLAS [Back to homepage]

Abstract In ‘Essential stuff’ (2008) and ‘Stuff’ (2009), Kristie Miller argues that two generally accepted theses, often formulated as follows, are incompatible: - (Temporal) mereological essentialism for stuff (or matter), the thesis that any portion of stuff has the same parts at every time it exists
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