David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 52 (2):177-206 (1985)
Does the viability of the discovery program depend on showing either (1) that methods of generating new problem solutions, per se, have special probative weight (the per se thesis); or, (2) that the original conception of an idea is logically continuous with its justification (anti-divorce thesis)? Many writers have identified these as the key issues of the discovery debate. McLaughlin, Pera, and others recently have defended the discovery program by attacking the divorce thesis, while Laudan has attacked the discovery program by rejecting the per se thesis. This disagreement over the central issue has led to communication breakdown. I contend that both friends and foes of discovery mistake the central issues. Recognizing a form of divorce helps rather than hurts the discovery program. However, the per se thesis is not essential to the program (nor is the related debate over novel prediction); hence, the status of the per se thesis is a side issue. With these clarifications in hand, we can proceed to the next stage of the discovery debate--the development (or revival) of a generative conception of justification which goes beyond consequentialism to forge a strong linkage of generation (or rather, generatability) with justification
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Alan G. Gross (1998). Do Disputes Over Priority Tell Us Anything About Science? Science in Context 11 (2):161.
James Blachowicz (1987). Discovery as Correction. Synthese 71 (3):235 - 321.
Arthur M. Diamond (1996). The Economics of Science. Knowledge and Policy 9 (2-3):6-49.
James Blachowicz (1996). Ampliative Abduction. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (2):141 – 157.
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