Beyond Pettit's neo-Roman republicanism: towards the deliberative republic
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5 (1):16-42 (2002)
| Abstract | Philip Pettit's neo-Roman republicanism comprises a conceptual account of ?republican freedom? and an institutional account that shows how republican freedom can best be promoted institutionally. If we accept a very slightly amended version of Petit's conceptual account, then his institutional account fares inadequately in terms of four ?problems? to which the conceptual account commits him. An institutional amalgam of Pettit's institutional account and a deliberative democratic public sphere of the sort advanced by john Dryzek ? what I call the deliberative republic ? looks to fare considerably better | |||||||||
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M. Victoria Costa (2009). Neo-Republicanism, Freedom as Non-Domination, and Citizen Virtue. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (4):401-419.
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