Can mereological sums serve as the semantic values of plurals?

Abstract
Abstract: Friends of plural logic—like Oliver & Smiley (2001), Rayo (2002), Yi (2005), and McKay (2006)—have argued that a semantics of plurals based on mereological sums would be too weak, and they have adduced several examples in favor of their claim. However, they have not considered various possible counter-arguments. So how convincing are their own arguments? We show that several of them are easily answered, while some others are more problematic. Overall, the case against mereological singularism—the idea that mereological sums can serve as the semantic values of plurals—turns out to be much less strong than what it is usually presented to be.
Keywords plurals  mereology  plural logic  semantics
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