Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 31 (February):141-145 (1977)
|Abstract||Davidson's defective defense of the consistency of (1) the causal interaction of mental and physical events, (2) the backing law thesis on causation, (3) the impossibility of lawfully explaining mental events is repaired by closer attention to the description-Relativity of explanation. Davidson wrongly allows that particular mental events are explainable when particular identities to physical events are known. The author argues that such identities are powerless to affect what features a given law can explain. Thus a great intelligence knowing all the physical laws could not explain a single mental event, As such, Even if he knew all particular identities|
|Keywords||Causality Determinism Event Explanation Identity Theory Mental Metaphysics Reductionism Davidson, D|
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