David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Science 331 (6023):1401-1403 (2011)
Many philosophical problems are rooted in everyday thought, and experimental philosophy uses social scientific techniques to study the psychological underpinnings of such problems. In the case of free will, research suggests that people in a diverse range of cultures reject determinism, but people give conflicting responses on whether determinism would undermine moral responsibility. When presented with abstract questions, people tend to maintain that determinism would undermine responsibility, but when presented with concrete cases of wrongdoing, people tend to say that determinism is consistent with moral responsibility. It remains unclear why people reject determinism and what drives people’s conflicted attitudes about responsibility. Experimental philosophy aims to address these issues and thereby illuminate the philosophical problem of free will.
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Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (2013). A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.
Felipe De Brigard & William Brady (2013). The Effect of What We Think May Happen on Our Judgments of Responsibility. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):259-269.
Stefaan E. Cuypers (2013). Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188.
Nicholas S. Fitz, Roland Nadler, Praveena Manogaran, Eugene W. J. Chong & Peter B. Reiner (2014). Public Attitudes Toward Cognitive Enhancement. Neuroethics 7 (2):173-188.
Vince Polito, Amanda J. Barnier & Erik Z. Woody (2013). Developing the Sense of Agency Rating Scale (SOARS): An Empirical Measure of Agency Disruption in Hypnosis. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):684-696.
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