Imagining and believing: The promise of a single code

Recent cognitive accounts of the imagination propose that imagining and believing are in the same “code”. According to the single code hypothesis, cognitive mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (“pretense representations”) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. In this paper, I argue that the single code hypothesis provides a unified and independently motivated explanation for a wide range of puzzles surrounding fiction.
Keywords Aesthetics  Emotion  Fiction  Imagination  Resistance
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DOI 10.1111/j.1540-594X.2004.00146.x
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References found in this work BETA
A. Goldman (1989). Interpretation Psychologized. Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.

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Citations of this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). What It Is to Pretend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):397-420.

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