Imagination and theI

Mind and Language 23 (5):518-535 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract:  Thought experiments about the self seem to lead to deeply conflicting intuitions about the self. Cases imagined from the 3rd person perspective seem to provoke different responses than cases imagined from the 1st person perspective. This paper argues that recent cognitive theories of the imagination, coupled with standard views about indexical concepts, help explain our reactions in the 1st person cases. The explanation helps identify intuitions that should not be trusted as a guide to the metaphysics of the self.
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). The First Person. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press. 45–65.
Simon Blackburn (1997). Has Kant Refuted Parfit? In J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit. Blackwell. 180--201.

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