|Abstract||The big philosophical questions about modality are metaphysical and epistemic: What are the truth-makers for our modal judgments? What justifies our modal judgments? These two questions are notoriously problematic.¹ What fact could make it true that blue swans are possible? And, assuming there is such a fact, what justifies our belief in that fact? Few philosophers think that there are easy answers here (see e.g. Gendler and Hawthorne 2002). Indeed, one might regard modal realism—the view that there exist infinitely many possible worlds (Lewis 1986)—as revealing the depth of philosophical desperation over modality.|
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