Just the imagination: Why imagining doesn't behave like believing

Mind and Language 21 (4):459–474 (2006)
According to recent accounts of the imagination, mental mechanisms that can take input from both imagining and from believing will process imagination-based inputs (pretense representations) and isomorphic beliefs in much the same way. That is, such a mechanism should produce similar outputs whether its input is the belief that p or the pretense representation that p. Unfortunately, there seem to be clear counterexamples to this hypothesis, for in many cases, imagining that p and believing that p have quite different psychological consequences. This paper sets out some central problem cases and argues that the cases might be accommodated by adverting to the role of desires concerning real and imaginary situations.
Keywords Dissertation, Imagination, Belief, Theory of Mind
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00286.x
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References found in this work BETA
A. Goldman (1989). Interpretation Psychologized. Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.
Alvin I. Goldman (1992). Empathy, Mind, and Morals. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):17 - 41.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Kung (2010). Imagining as a Guide to Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2007). Self-Deception as Pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258.
Shaun Nichols (2008). Imagination and theI. Mind and Language 23 (5):518-535.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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