Mr. Stearns on naturalism

Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (1):43-45 (1969)
This article criticizes an attempt by j. Brenton stearns to refute naturalism as an account of evaluative language ("a refutation of axiological naturalism," journal of value inquiry, I, No.2 (fall, 1967)). Stearns argued that if the goodness of a thing were, As naturalism claims, Equivalent to its possession of certain non-Evaluative properties, Then two things could differ from one another solely with respect to their goodness. And since this is impossible, Stearns concludes that naturalism is false. This argument is criticized by logical analogy. It is argued that if this argument shows that a naturalistic account of "good" is false, Then it equally shows that a naturalistic account of "large" or "primary color" is false
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DOI 10.1007/BF00137669
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