Journal of Value Inquiry 3 (1):43-45 (1969)
|Abstract||This article criticizes an attempt by j. Brenton stearns to refute naturalism as an account of evaluative language ("a refutation of axiological naturalism," journal of value inquiry, I, No.2 (fall, 1967)). Stearns argued that if the goodness of a thing were, As naturalism claims, Equivalent to its possession of certain non-Evaluative properties, Then two things could differ from one another solely with respect to their goodness. And since this is impossible, Stearns concludes that naturalism is false. This argument is criticized by logical analogy. It is argued that if this argument shows that a naturalistic account of "good" is false, Then it equally shows that a naturalistic account of "large" or "primary color" is false|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael Tye (1994). Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (September):122-42.
David Macarthur & Mario De Caro (2004). Introduction - the Nature of Naturalism. In Naturalism in Question. Harvard University Press.
Scott F. Aikin (2006). Pragmatism, Naturalism, and Phenomenology. Human Studies 29 (3):317 - 340.
James K. Beilby (ed.) (2002). Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Cornell University Press.
Jerome Arthur Stone (2008). Religious Naturalism Today: The Rebirth of a Forgotten Alternative. State University of New York Press.
Hans Fink (2006). Three Sorts of Naturalism. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.
J. Brenton Stearns (1967). A Refutation of Axiological Naturalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 1 (2):117-123.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads1 ( #291,386 of 722,776 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?