Moral testimony and its authority
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266 (2001)
| Abstract | A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this requirement when she relies on another person''s moral testimony, and so there are moral limits on such reliance. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesAdam Kadlac (forthcoming). Humanizing Personhood. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Joseph Lacey (2013). Moral Phenomenology and a Moral Ontology of the Human Person. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):51-73.
Robert Boostrom (1998). The Student as Moral Agent. Journal of Moral Education 27 (2):179-190.
Grenville Wall (1975). Moral Authority and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 4 (2):95-99.
Susanne Bobzien (2006). Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy. In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. CUP.
Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007). Moral Relativism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):123 - 143.
Rita C. Manning (1984). Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood. Journal of Business Ethics 3 (1):77 - 84.
Qingjie Wang (2010). Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (3):309-321.
Robert Hopkins (2007). What is Wrong with Moral Testimony? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
Hallvard Lillehammer (1997). Smith on Moral Fetishism. Analysis 57 (3):187–195.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads45 ( #24,510 of 549,069 )Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,703 of 549,069 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
