David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266 (2001)
A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet this requirement when she relies on another person''s moral testimony, and so there are moral limits on such reliance.
|Keywords||action autonomy cognitivism moral epistemology moral testimony reasons understanding|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Hallvard Lillehammer (2014). I—Moral Testimony, Moral Virtue, and the Value of Autonomy. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):111-127.
Paulina Sliwa (2012). In Defense of Moral Testimony. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
Robert J. Howell (2014). Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference. Noûs 48 (3):389-415.
Sarah McGrath (2009). The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference1. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
Andreas L. Mogensen (2015). Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
Similar books and articles
Adam Kadlac (2010). Humanizing Personhood. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):421 - 437.
Robert Hopkins (2007). What is Wrong with Moral Testimony? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
Qingjie Wang (2010). Virtue Ethics and Being Morally Moved. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9 (3):309-321.
Rita C. Manning (1984). Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood. Journal of Business Ethics 3 (1):77 - 84.
Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007). Moral Relativism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):123 - 143.
Susanne Bobzien (2006). Moral Responsibility and Moral Development in Epicurus’ Philosophy. In B. Reis & S. Haffmans (eds.), The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics. CUP
Grenville Wall (1975). Moral Authority and Moral Education. Journal of Moral Education 4 (2):95-99.
Robert Boostrom (1998). The Student as Moral Agent. Journal of Moral Education 27 (2):179-190.
Joseph Lacey (2013). Moral Phenomenology and a Moral Ontology of the Human Person. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):51-73.
Hallvard Lillehammer (1997). Smith on Moral Fetishism. Analysis 57 (3):187–195.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads95 ( #36,263 of 1,780,988 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #122,326 of 1,780,988 )
How can I increase my downloads?