David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
A physicalist view of qualia labelled non-eliminative reductionism is outlined. If it is true, qualia and physicalism can co-exist without difficulty. First, qualia present no particular problem for reductionist physicalism - they are entirely physical, can be studied and explained using the standard scientific approach, and present no problem any harder than any other scientists face. Second, reductionist physicalism presents no particular problem for qualia – they can be encompassed within an entirely physicalist position without any necessity, either to reduce them to non-existence, or to treat them as new fundamental properties. It is suggested that the position also has sufficient explanatory power to successfully deal with the 'why like anything – why does experience exist at all' question and to counter both Chalmers' Conceivability Argument and Jackson's Knowledge Argument.
|Keywords||Mind-body problem Physicalism Consciousness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Thomas Sturm (2012). Consciousness Regained? Philosophical Arguments for and Against Reductive Physicalism. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience 14 (1):55-63.
Brian Crabb (2010). Reductive Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties: The Nature of the Problem. Lambert Academic Publishers.
Tim Crane (2000). The Origins of Qualia. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.
A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Fredrik Stjernberg, Not so Epiphenomenal Qualia. Spinning Ideas.
Jürgen Schröder (1997). Qualia Und Physikalismus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (1):159-183.
Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 16.
Brent Silby (1998). On The Conceivability of Zombies. In Jack Copeland (ed.), Philosophy research paper series - Dept Philosophy, University of Canterbury.
Torin Alter, The Knowledge Argument. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
P. (2002). Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts. Theoria 17 (44):359-379.
David J. Chalmers (1995). Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 309--328.
Added to index2010-12-31
Total downloads57 ( #22,238 of 1,006,518 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #15,867 of 1,006,518 )
How can I increase my downloads?