David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Knowledge Argument is misconstructed. Knowing that it is ‘just obvious’ that Mary will learn something new on leaving her black and white room, we nevertheless assume she can acquire a complete knowledge of the physical inside it – thereby predetermining the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. If we reformulate the argument to leave the question of what she can learn in the room open, it becomes clear, not only that physicalism can survive the Knowledge Argument, but also that there is only one perspective on the relationship between qualia and the physical that will permit it to do so. If physicalism is true, this perspective must be the correct view of the qualia-physical relationship – the solution to the mind-body problem, a conclusion supported by its ability to resolve a number of associated difficulties, including Kripke’s problem for proposed identities and Chalmers’ Hard Problem.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Barbara Gail Montero (2000). The Body Problem and Other Foundational Issues in the Metaphysics of Mind. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
Dennis Nicholson (forthcoming). Non-Eliminative Reductionism: The Basis of a Science of Conscious Experience? Philosophical Psychology.
Luca Malatesti (2004). Knowing What It is Like and Knowing How. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins 55--119.
Philip Goff (forthcoming). Real Acquaintance and Physicalism. In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
Han-Kyul Kim (2008). Locke and the Mind-Body Problem: An Interpretation of His Agnosticism. Philosophy 83 (4):439-458.
Fredrik Stjernberg, Not so Epiphenomenal Qualia. Spinning Ideas.
Torin Alter (1998). A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
Gabriel Rabin (2011). Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
Torin Alter, The Knowledge Argument. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #56,517 of 1,777,777 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #206,198 of 1,777,777 )
How can I increase my downloads?