Toward a theory of the empirical tracking of individuals: Cognitive flexibility and the functions of attention in integrated tracking
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):353-387 (2009)
How do humans manage to keep track of a gradually changing object or person as the same persisting individual despite the fact that the extraction of information about this individual must often rely on heterogeneous information sources and heterogeneous tracking methods? The article introduces the Empirical Tracking of Individuals theory to address this problem. This theory proposes an analysis of the concept of integrated tracking, which refers to the capacity to acquire, store, and update information about the identity and location of individuals in our environment. It hypothesizes that certain functions of attention are a key to explaining how the cognitive flexibility of the human mind overcomes the heterogeneity of sources and methods in integrated tracking. At least two premises lend support to this hypothesis. First, heterogeneity of tracking sources is overcome by the combination of information from multiple perceptual modalities and a phenomenon of multisensory 'transparency'. Second, heterogeneity of tracking sources and methods may also be overcome by inferences that combine information across domains to acquire reasons to believe propositions about the target's location and identity
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Paul Abeles & John Morton (2000). Keeping Track: The Function of the Current State Buffer. Cognition 75 (3):179-208.
R. Arp (2006). The Environments of Our Hominin Ancestors, Tool-Usage, and Scenario Visualization. Biology and Philosophy 21 (1):95-117.
Scott Atran (1998). Folk Biology and the Anthropology of Science: Cognitive Universals and Cultural Particulars. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):547-569.
Bernard J. Baars (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Bernard J. Baars & J. B. Newman (eds.) (2001). Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Sam Wilkinson (2013). Egocentric and Encyclopedic Doxastic States in Delusions of Misidentification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):219-234.
Similar books and articles
Lars Gundersen (2010). Tracking, Epistemic Dispositions and the Conditional Analysis. Erkenntnis 72 (3):353 - 364.
Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2005). Resurrecting the Tracking Theories. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.
Pascal Boyer (1998). If “Tracking” is Category-Specific a “Common Structure” May Be Redundant. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):67-68.
Zenon Pylyshyn, Some Puzzling Findings in Multiple Object Tracking: I. Tracking Without Keeping Track of Object Identities.
Fred Adams & Murray Clarke (2007). Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8.
Nicolas Bullot (2008). Keeping Track of Invisible Individuals While Exploring a Spatial Layout with Partial Cues: Location-Based and Deictic Direction-Based Strategies. Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):15-46.
Nicolas Bullot (2007). A Study in the Cognition of Individuals' Identity: Solving the Problem of Singular Cognition in Object and Agent Tracking. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):276-293.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads16 ( #118,429 of 1,679,329 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #183,792 of 1,679,329 )
How can I increase my downloads?