David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334 (2010)
A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the agent, it can be responsive to reasons, and it is compatible with a subjective awareness of the available options
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Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Robert Booth (2014). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):529-539.
Rik Peels (2014). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.
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