Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis

A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing: it can express stable character traits of the agent, it can be responsive to reasons, and it is compatible with a subjective awareness of the available options
Keywords agnosticism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00380.x
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Conor McHugh (2012). Belief and Aims. Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Conor McHugh (2013). The Illusion of Exclusivity. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3).
Rik Peels (2014). Believing at Will is Possible. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.

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