David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 368-388 (2009)
Philosophical theorizing is often, either tacitly or explicitly, guided by intuitions about cases. Theories that accord with our intuitions are generally considered to be prima facie better than those that do not. However, recent empirical work has suggested that philosophically significant intuitions are variable and unstable in a number of ways. This variability of intuitions has led naturalistically inclined philosophers to disparage the practice of relying on intuitions for doing philosophy in general (e.g. Stich & Weinberg 2001) and for doing moral philosophy in particular (Appiah 2008; Doris & Stich 2005; Horowitz 1998; Nadelhoffer & Feltz 2008; Sinnott Armstrong 2008). In this paper, we will draw on naturalistic considerations to offer some solace to philosophers who rely on intuitions. We wouldn’t call this a defense of intuitions, exactly, since we are sympathetic with much of the naturalists’ critique. But we want to introduce into the debate some neglected naturalistic reasons to be optimistic about intuitions, focusing especially on ethical intuitions.
|Keywords||ethical intuitions diversity gender differences empirical moral progress|
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References found in this work BETA
Jesse J. Prinz (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books.
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003/2005). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
David Owen Brink (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Jennifer Wright (2010). On Intuitional Stability: The Clear, the Strong, and the Paradigmatic. Cognition 115 (3):491-503.
Hamid Seyedsayamdost (2015). On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication. Episteme 12 (1):95-116.
David Colaco, Wesley Buckwalter, Stephen Stich & Edouard Machery (2014). Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments. Episteme 11 (2):199-212.
Jennifer Wright (2013). Tracking Instability in Our Philosophical Judgments: Is It Intuitive? Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):485-501.
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