David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press (2006)
1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is more intimate then if you just have some concept or other of that property. To grasp a property is to understand what having that property essentially consists in.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jasper A. Bovenberg (2006). Property Rights in Blood, Genes and Data: Naturally Yours? Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Alessandro Giordani & Luca Mari (2012). Property Evaluation Types. Measurement 45 (3):437-452.
Arnold Cusmariu (1978). About Property Identity. Auslegung 5 (3):139-146.
Chienchih Chi (2004). A Mistaken Sense in Consciousness. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 11 (2):11-15.
Dean Zimmerman (2010). From Property Dualism to Substance Dualism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):119 - 150.
Fraser MacBride (2001). Can the Property Boom Last? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):225–246.
Hugh Breakey (2011). Two Concepts of Property: Ownership of Things and Property in Activities. Philosophical Forum 42 (3):239-265.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads89 ( #10,753 of 1,013,849 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #28,112 of 1,013,849 )
How can I increase my downloads?