On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument against physicalism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73 (1998)
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| Keywords | Belief Experience Knowledge Metaphysics Physicalism | |||||||||
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Martine Nida-Rümelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51 - 73.
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