On Belief about Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51 - 73 (1998)
| Abstract | The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the Knowledge Argument. The article distinguishes two rival accounts of the phenomenal/nonphenomenal distinction and explains how the result of the Knowledge Argument depends upon which of these accounts one wishes to accept. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesMartine Nida-Rümelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
Martine Nida-Rumelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
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