David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346-391 (2009)
We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims as well. We argue that this not the case. Our argument is based on the thesis that the best argument for the modal claim about violet is quite different from the best argument for the modal claim about reddish green. To argue for this disanalogy we propose a reconstruction of the best available justification for both claims.
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Citations of this work BETA
Fiona Macpherson (2015). The Structure of Experience, the Nature of the Visual, and Type 2 Blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 32:104 - 128.
Nicholas Unwin (2011). Why Do Colours Look the Way They Do?: Nicholas Unwin. Philosophy 86 (3):405-424.
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