Discussions dynamical explanation in cognitive science

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):139-163 (2006)
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Abstract

Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence

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