Representation and dynamics

Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):759-773 (2010)
Abstract
In the last decade several prominent critics have charged that invocation of representations is not only not essential for cognitive science, but should be avoided. These claims have been followed by counterarguments demonstrating that the notion certainly is important in explanations of cognitive phenomena. Analyzing some important contributions to the debate, Anthony Chemero has argued that representationalists still need to explain the significance of the notion once there is an available formal account of a system and has, accordingly, challenged representationalists to provide such an explanation. This paper's first part explains why the representationalist should take an interest in Chemero's challenge. It discusses William Bechtel's account of the representational structure of the Watt Governor, which, among other things, was motivating Chemero to question the relevance of a representational account once a dynamical one is available. The second part contains the answer to Chemero's challenge. It is motivated by the thought that only a representational account of the Watt Governor with a comparable level of detail could possibly add explanatory value to a dynamical account. However, accepting the account also means that it becomes difficult to understand dynamical and representational accounts as rivals. Instead, it would be more adequate to speak of a dynamical account of the representational structure.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Daniel C. Dennett (1998). Revolution, No! Reform, Si! Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):636-637.

    View all 13 references

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Robert van Gulick (1982). Mental Representation: A Functionalist View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):3-20.
    Laura Ruetsche (2003). Modal Semantics, Modal Dynamics and the Problem of State Preparation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):25 – 41.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-12-09

    Total downloads

    14 ( #95,283 of 1,089,057 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,801 of 1,089,057 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.