David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoria 71 (2):182-199 (2005)
In this paper a bootstrap theory of rationality is presented. Such a theory is an attempt to explain how standards of rational inquiry may be rationally revised — without assuming that there are any basic and fixed standards for evaluating such revisions. The general bootstrap idea is briefly presented in the first sections. The main part of the paper consists of a discussion of what normative requirements a bootstrap theory should contain, and a number of requirements on rational revisions are proposed. The final section deals with the question of whether a bootstrap theory is self-referentially coherent.
|Keywords||bootstrap theory revisability inquiry rationality methodology|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
L. Laudan (1977). Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. University of California Press.
Clark Glymour (1980). Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press.
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