David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (2):238-250 (2009)
Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language.
|Keywords||moral nature moral convention origin of moral consciousness 道德本性 道德约定 道德意识的起源|
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References found in this work BETA
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Adam Smith (1790/2006). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Dover Publications.
Max Scheler (1973). Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. Evanston,Northwestern University Press.
Dorothy Emmett & Michael Oakeshott (1963). Rationalism in Politics, and Other Essays. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (52):283.
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