Propositions, semantic values, and rigidity

Philosophical Studies 158 (3):401-413 (2012)
Abstract
Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values.
Keywords Propositions  Operators  Quantifiers  Tense  Modality  Rigidity  Two-dimensionalism
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References found in this work BETA
Jeffrey C. King (2003). Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):195–246.
David Lewis (1980). Index, Context, and Content. In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. 79-100.
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