Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions

Abstract
Russell's "new contradiction" about "the totality of propositions" has been connected with a number of modal paradoxes. M. Oksanen has recently shown how these modal paradoxes are resolved in the set theory NFU. Russell's paradox of the totality of propositions was left unexplained, however. We reconstruct Russell's argument and explain how it is resolved in two intensional logics that are equiconsistent with NFU. We also show how different notions of possible worlds are represented in these intensional logics
Keywords Russell, Bertrand
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DOI 10.1080/08066200050217977
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Gabriel Uzquiano (2015). Modality and Paradox. Philosophy Compass 10 (4):284-300.

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Kevin C. Klement (2003). Russell-Myhill Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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Paul M. Livingston (2009). Agamben, Badiou, and Russell. Continental Philosophy Review 42 (3):297-325.

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