David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Utilitas 6 (02):217- (1994)
Some people have supposed that utility is good in itself, non-in-strumentally good, as distinct from good because conducive to other good things. And in modern versions of this view, utility often means want-satisfaction, as distinct from pleasure or happiness. For your want that p to be satisfied, is it necessary that you know or believe that p, or sufficient merely that p is true? However that question is answered, there are problems with the view that want-satisfaction is a non-instrumental good. What if you want something only because you have a false belief? What if the time at which you want that p is fifty or five hundred years before the time to which p itself refers? To meet these difficulties, qualifications have to be introduced, and much has been written about how exactly these qualifications are to be framed.1 There is however what may be a rather more serious objection to the view that want-satisfaction is a non-instrumental good, or rather to the combination of that view with the principle that it is sufficient for your want that p to be satisfied simply that p is true. The objection is that this combination forces you to give undue weight to the mere acquisition of desires when you come to make judgements about changes in the value of things. It forces you to say that for any true proposition p, which initially you do not want to be true, your mere acquisition of a desire that p will, other things being equal, make the world better. Non-instrumental value can be increased merely by multiplying desires, even though everything else remains the same. Surely, however, improving the world is not as easy as that
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
M. Krynicki & K. Zdanowski (2005). Theories of Arithmetics in Finite Models. Journal of Symbolic Logic 70 (1):1-28.
Paul Weirich (2010). Utility and Framing. Synthese 176 (1):83 - 103.
Dirk Schlimm & Hansjörg Neth (2008). Modeling Ancient and Modern Arithmetic Practices: Addition and Multiplication with Arabic and Roman Numerals. In B. C. Love, K. McRae & V. M. Sloutsky (eds.), Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 2097--2102.
Wesley Cooper (2008). Decision-Value Utilitarianism. Polish Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):39-50.
D. Marker & A. Pillay (1990). Reducts of (C, +, ⋅) Which Contain +. Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (3):1243-1251.
Françoise Maurin (1997). The Theory of Integer Multiplication with Order Restricted to Primes is Decidable. Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (1):123-130.
Stephen A. Clark (2000). Revealed Preference and Expected Utility. Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Marc le Menestrel (2001). A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling. Theory and Decision 50 (3):249-262.
Jean-François Bonnefon & Steven A. Sloman (2013). The Causal Structure of Utility Conditionals. Cognitive Science 37 (1):193-209.
Paul Weirich (1984). Interpersonal Utility in Principles of Social Choice. Erkenntnis 21 (3):295 - 317.
Per-erik Malmnäs (1994). Axiomatic Justifications of the Utility Principle: A Formal Investigation. Synthese 99 (2):233 - 249.
Hans Lottenbach (1994). Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48.
Xavier Vidaux (2002). Multiplication Complexe Et Équivalence Élémentaire Dans le Langage Des Corps. Journal of Symbolic Logic 67 (2):635-648.
Ulrich Schmidt (2001). Lottery Dependent Utility: A Reexamination. Theory and Decision 50 (1):35-58.
Eckehard F. Rosenbaum (1995). Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Positive, Normative or Value-Laden? Journal of Economic Methodology 2 (2):239-258.
Added to index2010-08-30
Total downloads4 ( #366,528 of 1,696,445 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #339,109 of 1,696,445 )
How can I increase my downloads?