Review of Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):184-184 (2001)
Reviews the book, Neurophilosophy of free will: From libertarian illusions to a concept of natural autonomy by Henrik Walter and C. Klohr . In this book, Henrik Walter applies the methodology of neurophilosophy to one of philosophy’s central challenges and enduring questions: the notion of free will. The author argues that free will is an illusion if we mean by it that under identical conditions we would be able to do or decide otherwise, while simultaneously acting only for reasons and being the true originators of our actions. In place of this problematic version of free will, Walter offers what he calls “natural autonomy,” that is, self-determination unaided by supernatural powers that could exist even in an entirely determined universe. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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