David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Theory and Practice 28 (1):135-156 (2002)
"Nobis argues that Singer's consequentialist approach is inadequate for defending the moral obligation to become a vegetarian or vegan. The consequentialist case rests on the idea that being a vegetarian or vegan maximizes utility -- the fewer animals that are raised and killed for food, the less suffering. Nobis argues that this argument does not work on an individual level -- my becoming a vegetarian makes no difference to the overall utility of reducing animal suffering in a context of a huge industry and market unaffected by my actions. Nobis merges the insights of virtue ethics with consequentialism to argue that individuals can bring about more goodness if they have the virtues of compassion, care, and sensitivity to unnecessary cruelty and suffering. If one ought to be compassionate, sensitive to cruelty, resist injustice, and be morally integrated, then, Nobis argues, one ought to be a vegetarian or vegan.".
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James Garvey (2011). Climate Change and Causal Inefficacy: Why Go Green When It Makes No Difference? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69:157-174.
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Cheryl Abbate (2014). Virtues and Animals: A Minimally Decent Ethic for Practical Living in a Non-Ideal World. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (6):1-23.
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