David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 61 (1):41-60 (2001)
This paper investigates a new species of skeptical reasoning about visual experience that takes its start from developments in perceptual science (especially recent work on change blindness and inattentional blindness). According to this skepticism, the impression of visual awareness of the environment in full detail and high resolution is illusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends on misguided assumptions about the character of perceptual experience, about whether perceptual experiences are 'internal' states, and about how best to understand the relationship between a person's or animal's perceptual capacities and the brain-level or neural processes on which they depend. I propose a conception of perceptual experience as a form of skillful engagement with the environment on the part of the whole person or animal
|Keywords||Experience Internalism Metaphysics Mind Representation Scepticism Vision|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jason Leddington (2009). Perceptual Presence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502.
Søren Overgaard (2010). On the Looks of Things. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):260-284.
Anil Gupta (2012). An Account of Conscious Experience. Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):1-29.
Paul Teller (2010). Mechanism, Reduction, and Emergence in Two Stories of the Human Epistemic Enterprise. Erkenntnis 73 (3):413 - 425.
Similar books and articles
Martin Davies (1997). Externalism and Experience. In Ned Block & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Mit Press. 244-250.
Alva Noë, Luis Pessoa & Evan Thompson (2000). Beyond the Grand Illusion: What Change Blindness Really Teaches Us About Vision. Visual Cognition 7 (1-3):93-106.
Leslie F. Stevenson (2000). Synthetic Unities of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.
Alva Noë (2006). Experience Without the Head. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 411--433.
Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
Robert Schroer (2012). Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595 - 615.
Charles S. Travis (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Alva Noë (2001). Experience and the Active Mind. Synthese 129 (1):41-60.
T. M. Crowther (2006). Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism. Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads61 ( #30,976 of 1,681,636 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #78,876 of 1,681,636 )
How can I increase my downloads?