David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Following coma, some patients will recover wakefulness without signs of consciousness (only showing reflex movements, i.e., the vegetative state) or may show non-reflex movements but remain without functional communication (i.e., the minimally conscious state). Currently, there remains a high rate of misdiagnosis of the vegetative state (Schnakers et. al. BMC Neurol, 9:35, 8) and the clinical and electrophysiological markers of outcome from the vegetative and minimally conscious states remain unsatisfactory. This should incite clinicians to use multimodal assessment to detect objective signs of consciousness and validate para-clinical prognostic markers in these challenging patients. This review will focus on advanced magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) techniques such as magnetic resonance spectroscopy, diffusion tensor imaging, and functional MRI (fMRI studies in both “activation” and “resting state” conditions) that were recently introduced in the assessment of patients with..
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