Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185 - 194 (2002)
Abstract
As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self-consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self-consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
Keywords Metaphysics  Perception  Self-consciousness  Hurley, S
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Susan L. Hurley (2001). Overintellectualizing the Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):423-431.

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