Is Perspectival Self-Consciousness Non-Conceptual?

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):185 - 194 (2002)
As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do (e.g., on our movements). This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self-consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self-consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.
Keywords Metaphysics  Perception  Self-consciousness  Hurley, S
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00261
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References found in this work BETA
Wilfrid S. Sellars (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

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Robert A. Wilson (2003). Intentionality and Phenomenology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):413-431.

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