David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (1):71-90 (2004)
This paper presents an argument for metaphysical realism, understood as the claim that the world has structure that would exist even if our cognitive activities never did. The argument is based on the existence of a structured world at a time when it was still possible that we would never evolve. But the interpretation of its premises introduces subtleties: whether, for example, these premises are to be understood as assertions about the world or about our evidence, internally or externally, via assertibility conditions or truth conditions – and what sorts of beings are included in the `we' upon whose cognitions the antirealist supposes the structure of the world to depend. I argue that antirealism can provide no defensible, fully articulated interpretation of the premises that either shows them not to be true or defeats the reasoning.
|Keywords||antirealism metaphysics realism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Chris Calvert-Minor (2009). Commonsense Realism and Triangulation. Philosophia 37 (1):67-86.
D. Efird & T. Stoneham (2005). Genuine Modal Realism and the Empty World. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):21-37.
Sophie R. Allen (2002). Deepening the Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism. Philosophy 77 (4):519-541.
Jürgen Dümont (1999). Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument(S). A Detailed Reconstruction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 30 (2):341-364.
Neil Sinclair (2011). The Explanationist Argument for Moral Realism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):1-24.
G. H. Merrill (1980). The Model-Theoretic Argument Against Realism. Philosophy of Science 47 (1):69-81.
Stephen J. Boulter (2004). Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-Condition of Visual Perception. Biology and Philosophy 19 (2):243-261.
Michael Devitt (2002). Moral Realism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-15.
Sven Rosenkranz (2006). Priest and the Bishop. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):335–347.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads60 ( #67,710 of 1,790,225 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #427,637 of 1,790,225 )
How can I increase my downloads?