David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In B. Hale & A. Hoffman (eds.), Modality. Oxford University Press 220-226 (2010)
The question of the function of modal judgement is an interesting philosophical issue, and John Divers's paper (this volume) has persuaded me that it has not received the attention it deserves. I think it is an important and interesting question even apart from any more ambitious claims that are made about its role in settling other issues about modality. Even if we became convinced that the story about function put no constraints whatsoever, epistemologically or metaphysically, on a theory of modality, it would still remain an interesting question about one of the pervasive and perhaps fundamental things we do in our cognitive lives.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Divers (2004). Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):660–685.
Osamu Kiritani (2011). Function and Modality. Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (1):1-4.
Josh Parsons (2007). Is Everything a World? Philosophical Studies 134 (2):165-181.
John Divers & Jason Hagen (2006). The Modal Fictionalist Predicament. In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press 57.
John Divers (1999). A Genuine Realist Theory of Advanced Modalizing. Mind 108 (430):217-239.
John Divers (1992). Modal Supereminence and Modal Realism. Theoria 58 (2-3):99-115.
Alexander Paseau (2006). Genuine Modal Realism and Completeness. Mind 115 (459):721-730.
John Divers (1999). A Modal Fictionalist Result. Noûs 33 (3):317-346.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads157 ( #13,636 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)134 ( #5,079 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?