David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 47 (4):505-531 (1980)
Kripke and Putnam have proposed that terms may be introduced to refer to theoretical entities by means of causal descriptions such as 'whatever causes observable effects O'. It is argued that such a reference-fixing definition is ill-formed and that theoretical beliefs must be involved in fixing the reference of a theoretical term. Some examples of reference-fixing are discussed e.g., the term 'electricity'. The Kripke-Putnam theory can not give an account of how terms may be introduced into science and then subsequently be discovered to be non-referring. A modified account of reference-fixing is suggested in which terms such as Gilbert's electric effluvia' and 'phlogiston' can be introduced into science and then be found to lack a reference
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Citations of this work BETA
John Michael & Miles Macleod (2013). Applying the Causal Theory of Reference to Intentional Concepts. Philosophy of Science 80 (2):212-230.
Ioannis Votsis (2011). Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference. Synthese 180 (2):121 - 137.
Howard Sankey (1991). Translation Failure Between Theories. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22 (2):223-236.
Andreas Bartels (2010). Explaining Referential Stability of Physics Concepts: The Semantic Embedding Approach. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (2):267 - 281.
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