'Paradigms lost, or the world regained' —an excursion into realism and idealism in science

Synthese 45 (3):317 - 350 (1980)
Abstract
Tensions between idealism and scientific realism have been resolved by an appeal to the theory/observation distinction. but many who support incommensurability reject the distinction in favor of a version of idealism, e.g., thomas kuhn who supports a version of relativist idealism in which the terms of a theory do refer, but only to a paradigm--relative world of entities. it is argued that the three kinds of idealism depend on a cluster theory of meaning for fixing the reference of scientific terms, and that a realist interpretation of the growth of science must eschew such a theory of meaning. the kripke-putnam theory for reference fixing of theoretical terms is employed to show how one term, 'mass', is referentially invariant despite change in the theory of motion from newton to einstein
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References found in this work BETA
John Earman & Arthur Fine (1977). Against Indeterminacy. Journal of Philosophy 74 (9):535-538.
Paul Feyerabend (1970). Consolations for the Specialist1. In Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press. 197.

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Citations of this work BETA
Dieter Freundlieb (1987). Hermeneutics and Semantics. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 18 (1-2):110-133.
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