Truth as an epistemic ideal

Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):203 - 237 (2008)
Abstract
Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if it can be fixedly warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions. This paper offers a general critique of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth” defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent upon one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also upon one’s standards of warrant.
Keywords inquiry  Kripke semantics  Peirce, C.S.  superassertibility  truth  warrant  Wright, Crispin
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    2009-04-15

                 

    From MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS.

    MR2398883

    Nolt, J. 2008 Truth as an Epistemic Ideal. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 37: 203-237.

     

                The abstract of the paper being reviewed is as follows.

    “Several philosophers—including C. S. Peirce, William James, Hilary Putnam, and Crispin Wright—have proposed various versions of the notion that truth is an epistemic ideal. More specifically, they have held that a proposition is true if and only if it can be fixedly [sic] warranted by human inquirers, given certain ideal epistemic conditions [emphasis added]. This paper offers a general critique of that idea, modeling conceptions of ideality and fixed warrant within the semantics that Kripke developed for intuitionistic logic. It is shown that each of the two plausible notions of fixed warrant faces difficulties and that, moreover, “truth” defined in terms of either of them is distressingly dependent on one’s conception of idealized inquiry and perhaps also upon one’s standards of warrant.”

        ... (read more)