Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 4:171-192 (2008)
|Abstract||To what extent do true predications correspond to truthmakers in virtue of which those predications are true? One sort of predicate which is often thought to not be susceptible to an ontological treatment is a predicate for instantiation, or some corresponding predication (trope-similarity or set-membership, for example). This paper discusses this question, and argues that an "ontological" approach is possible here too: where this ontological approach goes beyond merely finding a truthmaker for claims about instantiation. Along the way a version of the problem of the regress of instantiation is posed and solved.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Alessandro Lenci (1998). The Structure of Predication. Synthese 114 (2):233-276.
Thomas J. McKay (2006). Plural Predication. Oxford University Press.
Jamin Asay (2011). Truthmaking, Truth, and Realism: New Work for a Theory of Truthmakers. Dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Philipp Keller (2007). A World of Truthmakers. In Jean-Maurice Monnoyer (ed.), Metaphysics and Truthmakers. Ontos Verlag.
Wolfgang Freitag (2008). Truthmakers (Are Indexed Combinations). Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):228-248.
Ross P. Cameron (2008). How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist. Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower (2006). A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:357-386.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005). Why Truthmakers. In H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006). Truthmakers. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads77 ( #12,770 of 722,748 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,748 )
How can I increase my downloads?