A flawed argument for perdurance – reply to braddon-Mitchell and Miller
Analysis 65 (286):164–166 (2005)
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Torin Alter (2007). On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 134 (2):235 - 253.
Torin Alter (2006). On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):777-778.
David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). How Do We Know It is Now Now? Analysis 64 (3):199–203.
Yuri Balashov (2009). Pegs, Boards, and Relativistic Perdurance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):167-175.
Simon Prosser (2007). Could We Experience the Passage of Time? Ratio 20 (1):75-90.
Peter Forrest (2004). The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2006). The Physics of Extended Simples. Analysis 66 (3):222–226.
David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller (2004). The Loneliness of Stages. Analysis 64 (3):235–242.
Harold W. Noonan (2003). A Flawed Argument for Perdurance. Analysis 63 (279):213–215.
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