Causation by content?

Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320 (1999)
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Abstract

Non-reductive Physicalism together with environment-dependence of content has been thought to be incompatible with the claim that beliefs are efficacious partly in virtue of their possession of content, that is, in virtue of their intentional properties. I argue that this is not so. First, I provide a general account of property causation. Then, I explain how, even given the truth of Non-reductive Physicalism and the environment-dependence of content, intentional properties will be efficacious according to this account. I go on to relate my discussion to that concerning whether Anomalous Monism is committed to epiphenomenalism. I close by considering how my proposal suggests we should conceive of different levels of causation in a layered world.

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Paul Noordhof
University of York

Citations of this work

Basic deviance reconsidered.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):186–194.
Nonreductive materialism I. introduction.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckermann (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Basic deviance reconsidered.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Analysis 67 (295):186-194.

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