David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455 (2002)
A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue that the Dependency Thesis is false and that, in any event, it does not have the explanatory credentials claimed for it. Some of the features of imaginative experience are incorrectly specified, namely the absence of presentation of sensory qualities. With a more precise idea of what we need to explain, I argue that the explanation should proceed by noting that imagination and perception have phenomenally similar contents and that this is to be explained in terms of the similar kinds of representations in play. I trace the consequences of my discussion for disjunctivist theories of perception, Berkeleian Idealism and the characterisation of knowing what an experience is like
|Keywords||Dependency Epistemology Imagining Perception Senses|
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Citations of this work BETA
Nick Wiltsher (2016). Against the Additive View of Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):266-282.
Bence Nanay (2015). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
Peter Langland-Hassan (2015). Self-Knowledge and Imagination. Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):226-245.
Kathleen Stock (2013). Imagining and Fiction: Some Issues. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):887-896.
Ignacio Ávila (forthcoming). Is Bodily Awareness a Form of Perception? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
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