David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 108 (429):95-125 (1999)
Counter factual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts and anti-catalysts, and show how my account needs to be adjusted to deliver the right verdicts in these cases. The net result is a particular conception of a cause that I try to spell out in the closing section of the paper. In that section, I also briefly discuss causal asymmetry and the purpose behind providing a counterfactual theory of causation.
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Christopher Hitchcock (2011). Trumping and Contrastive Causation. Synthese 181 (2):227 - 240.
Stephen Barker (2003). Counterfactual Analyses of Causation: The Problem of Effects and Epiphenomena Revisited. Noûs 37 (1):133–150.
Anthony F. Peressini (2016). Imprecise Probability and Chance. Erkenntnis 81 (3):561-586.
Jack Ritchie (2005). Causal Compatibilism -- What Chance? Erkenntnis 63 (1):119-132.
Paul Noordhof (2002). Personal Dualism and the Argument From Differential Vagueness. Philosophical Papers 31 (1):63-86.
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